

[1]

EXHIBIT No. 30

UNITED STATES FLEET

CinC File No.

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, FLAGSHIP

Secret

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.  
18 February 1941.

DEAR BETTY: Your letter of 29 January reached me on 14 February, and your letter of 10 February arrived on board on 16 February. You will note that the delays were due to interferences with clipper schedules.

A check has already been sent to the Navy Relief for \$39,000.00 and one to the American Red Cross for \$9,900.00. This was done by Richardson just prior to his detachment. I trust that the Navy Relief has received it by now.

I will inform Bloch in regard to the search of fishermen and think it an excellent idea. I believe this search has been in effect here for some time.

Nimitz has written me to put not more than 100% complement on any type of ship. I will pass this along to Calhoun, but with the present rates of supply and attrition I see small chance of exceeding 100%.

I wrote Nimitz today in regard to the Bureau of Ordnance requirements for post-graduate ordnance officers to be employed on shore, and asked Nimitz to show you the letter when he receives it. You will note that I took occasion in this letter to reiterate the need for additional enlisted personnel in all types of ships. From my standpoint there is every urge to train just as many men as is possible. This is in addition to the need for men in existing ships. The new construction program will, in a reasonable time, make inordinate demands on the Fleet. I would repeat here what I said in my letter to Nimitz, that the condition of the Fleet within the next few months may be of much greater importance to the nation than the completion of the two-ocean Navy in 1946.

I was delighted to learn about the Army fighters. The first contingent is now on its way, together with certain equipment for the outlying islands. In addition to the fighters I believe it of the highest importance to send just as many Army bombers and adequate supplies of bombs to Oahu as the Army establishment can support with the greatest effort. The need for Army anti-aircraft guns should also be stressed. Active and immediate steps are being taken to coordinate the Army and Navy air effort as well as the ground crew defenses of Pearl Harbor

[2] I had a couple of interviews with Short and find him fully alive to the situation and highly cooperative. I recommend that you keep continuous pressure on this question of Army reinforcement of Oahu.

The full complement of Marines has landed at Midway. We utilized Crudiv EIGHT, Desdiv ELEVEN, and the ANTARES to transfer troops, baggage, equipment, etc. You will have received our statement of the conditions existing at Johnson and Palmyra. In this I tried to give you a complete picture, together with the only possible solution I see with the forces available. The transfer to these islands of the maximum numbers you indicated may carry with it very difficult complications, as a sudden call in the midst of the operation might involve serious consequences. As I gather from researches, the orders involve a drastic change from the original conception of the forces to be supported at Johnson and Palmyra. I think our recommendation to send 100 Marines to Palmyra and none to Johnson for the present, should be accepted.

Will study, prepare plans, and be ready for a quick decision in case orders are received for a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make the proposed cruise to Manila or elsewhere. From my standpoint this appears to be a most ill-advised move. Our strength in destroyers and cruisers is already limited. A carrier can ill be spared if we are to carry out other proposed plans. While my political horizon is limited, I believe we should be prepared for war when we make this move.

The detail of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District will have to be made from the Fleet. This is a further drain on our small craft. In this connection I am recommending in separate correspondence that you send out one squadron of PTs and one squadron of the new PTC sub-chasers at the earliest possible date. I presume Bloch has his plans for commandeering local craft, but I will check with him and also inform him of the probability that the Coast Guard will be taken over shortly.

Bill Halsey has been bombarding the Bureau of Ordnance in an attempt to get an increased supply of bombs. The copy of their reply, which I think you should read, leaves us with very little hope for early alleviation of this most unsatisfactory condition. In separate correspondence, which will go forward at the same time as this letter, we are recommending the shipment of these bombs to Oahu in advance of the preparation of regulation proof stowages. I think we must accept the hazard and possible [3] deterioration which may ensue from shelter stowage. The total lack of incendiary bombs should be remedied at the earliest date.

The subject of reserve ammunition for the Fleet has been covered in various letters. I feel that the number of ammunition ships in commission and being converted is still entirely inadequate to handle the situation.

I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. We are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces,—DDs and patrol craft. The two squadrons of patrol craft will help when they arrive.

After a thorough investigation, we are proceeding to fit existing facilities at the Submarine Base to permit shore basing my staff and myself. Just when I will move ashore depends upon the supply of essential equipment. I have only one object, that is to so place myself and my staff that we can best accomplish the task before us.

To revert once more to the question of enlisted personnel, Theobald's board, in my opinion, has contributed more to the Fleet than any single factor in a very long time. It did a most excellent job and, in the absence of positive evidence that they are wrong, we should accept their recommendations. I have ordered the Medical Board, the members of which represent all types of ships, and have told them to expedite their proceedings. I propose to give you their findings by despatch.

Before the report of the Fleet Personnel Board reached your office, I sent you a despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed by the Board for each type of ship. In reply I was informed by despatch that the complements recommended exceeded those assigned in the Force Operating Plan for 1942, and was instructed not to install bunks, lockers, and messing facilities in excess of the complements already arrived at by the Department. I am so convinced that the complements recommended by the Fleet Personnel Board are the minimum required to serve the ships in a campaign, and that the findings of the Medical Board will not declare the larger complements to be contrary to standards of health and comfort, that I sent another despatch last night asking for a reconsideration of your decision. Bunks [4] and lockers do not add greatly to the weight of a ship and are not unduly expensive. It is my frank opinion, as stated in the most recent despatch on this subject, that even if complements are not increased immediately to the limit recommended, it is better to install bunks and lockers now rather than do so in the confusion of mobilization, for I am convinced that if we take part in this war we shall most certainly have to build up our complements as recommended by the Fleet Board.

The Bureau of Navigation has forwarded me a long list of officers of post graduate training, now afloat, wanted by the Bureau of Ordnance for duty ashore. These officers occupy important command, gunnery, and staff positions. I realize the necessity for expediting ordnance projects and I want to help in every way I can. But the number of experienced officers in the ships at the present time is dangerously low. I can not view the detachment of additional experienced officers but with the greatest concern. I have asked the Bureau of Navigation to give me an opportunity to comment on the detachment in each case of officers with ordnance experience, prior to final action.

I also hope that drastic steps can be taken to stop the continuing turnover of personnel, particularly qualified personnel. The detachment and changes of qualified enlisted men concerns me almost as much as the detachment of qualified and experienced officers.

I come to another question of the highest importance, the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet. I am forwarding under separate cover a copy of a letter written to the Bureau of Aeronautics on this subject. I have gathered the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and personnel to man the Fleet takes a secondary place. Obstacles are offered to most of Halsey's recommendations. I cannot subscribe to these views. We must have the most modern planes in our carriers and other surface vessels, in fact



in all the aeronautical organizations afloat. I realize of course the necessity for personnel ashore, particularly in the aeronautical organization, to train new personnel and to produce the material. But the balance should be maintained, and in any event the latest type planes should be supplied the Fleets. The forces afloat have repeatedly recommended the acquisition of two or more "seatrains" vessels to transport airplanes. I am not familiar with the technical difficulties involved, but if it is at all possible to do so—and Halsey in- [5] sists that it is—I think this work should be undertaken at once. The recent required use of carriers to transport Army planes to Oahu illustrates the necessity for providing some means for airplane transport. Transporting planes and equipment by carrier is highly expensive, both in lost training of flyers and non-availability of carrier for other duty.

We are going ahead with Plan Dog and RAINBOW THREE. Prior to the receipt of the letters received in the mail yesterday we had given priority to Plan Dog, but as you state you wish priority to be given RAINBOW THREE, we will do so.

The necessity for additional store ships and transports is accentuated by placing Marines on the outlying islands and I hope nothing will stand in the way to promptly supply those now planned, and to further increase them as soon as practicable.

I shall decide upon the distribution of the exploders after consultation with Withers and Draemel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

H. E. KIMMEL

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy*

*Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

P. S. We received through radio and other intelligence rather reliable reports on the positions of Japanese merchant ships, but we have no definite information on the important Japanese *trade routes*. Can you send us the latest information you have on this? I am initiating separate correspondence on this topic.

I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?

Exhibit No. 31

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op 10 Hg

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Washington, 25 February 1941.

Dear Kimmel: I suppose by this time your staff is working smoothly on the beach. It is most important, as I have indicated previously, that as soon as possible you get your Operating Plan for Rainbow III in the hands of Admiral Hart and your own subordinate commanders, including those in command of the Pacific and the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontiers. Then we can get ready the subordinate operating plans and the logistic requirements, the latter being of special importance to you in your advanced position.

Particularly in connection with your logistic planning, some of us here have wondered as to whether or not you might also put the Commander Basil Fiske and his staff ashore in a status more or less similar to your own. However, this is your job and I just mention it en passant.

Even if we fight this war according to "Plan Dog", we have so designed Rainbow III that a shift to "Dog" (see my despatch of January) will (at least at first) require only minor changes in the tasks of either the Basic Plan or your